Party Appeal, Asymmetric Elite Polarization, and Voter Turnout

Yuta Okamoto () and Yuuki Ozaki ()
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Yuta Okamoto: Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University
Yuuki Ozaki: Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

No 1116, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper studies a root of asymmetric party polarization, where one party becomes more ideologically extreme and the other remains relatively moderate. In a modified two-party Hotelling-Downs model with heterogeneous electorates - which differ in incentives to vote - we show that when one party experiences a disproportionate decline in public appeal, the resulting equilibrium features asymmetric polarization and higher voter turnout, in line with recent elections.

Keywords: abstention; Hotelling-Downs model; party's appeal; political polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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