Public Debt Consolidation under Risky Human Capital
Spyros Lazarakis and
Max Schroeder
No 442390386, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department
Abstract:
How should governments deleverage public debt, and who gains or loses under alternative fiscal packages? We study this question in a heterogeneous-agent general-equilibrium model with endogenous assets, labour supply, and human-capital accumulation, calibrated to the pre-pandemic United Kingdom. The government reduces the public-debt stock by an amount equal to 10 percent of initial output over 25 years. We compare front-loaded, linear, and back-loaded schedules; labour-tax, returns-tax, and transfer closures; and four uses of the fiscal capacity created by lower debt service: Government Spending, Fiscal Discipline, Additional Transfers, and Public Investment. Four results stand out. First, we find a clear ranking among the fiscal instruments: labour taxation usually creates the largest welfare losses, followed by transfer reductions, while returns taxation generates the smallest losses. Second, among workers alive when the policy is announced, back-loaded paths generally deliver higher mean welfare, but heterogeneity can create conflicts of interest that may change this ranking. Third, endogenous human capital amplifies the cost of labour-tax consolidation. Fourth, fiscal headroom is itself distributional; Fiscal Discipline protects households exposed to the chosen closure instrument; Additional Transfers build support among low-asset households, especially under returns-tax financing; and Public Investment creates broader productivity gains and can make faster deleveraging politically attractive. Debt reduction should therefore be evaluated as a package combining the debt path, the fiscal instrument, and the allocation of fiscal headroom.
Keywords: public debt; fiscal consolidation; heterogeneous agents; inequality; human capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-univers ... casterWP2026_002.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:442390386
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giorgio Motta ().