Voronoi game on disjoint open curves

Marcin Konrad Dziubinski

No 591829, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K open curves of identical lengths, with N > K greater than or equal to 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that, if an analogical game is played on disjoint closed curves, the second mover advantage is in place only if K = 1, while for K > 1 both players have a tying strategy. It was also shown that this results hold for open curves of identical lengths when rules of the game additionally require players to take exactly one location in the rst round. In this paper we show that the second mover advantage is still in place for K greater than or equal to 1 and 2K -1 less than or equal to N, even if the additional restriction is dropped, while K is less than or euqal to N <2K -1 results in the first mover advantage. We also study a natural variant of the game, where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location and we show that the second mover advantage re-appears for K is less than or equal to N <2K -1 if K is an even number.

Keywords: Competitive locations; Disjoint spaces; Winning/Tying strategies; Equilibrium congurations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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