The Brazilian Swindle and The Larger International Monetary Problem

James K. Galbraith

Economics Policy Note Archive from Levy Economics Institute

Abstract: The IMF has offered Brazil a $30 billion loan, most of it reserved for next year, on condition that the country continue to run a large primary surplus in the government budget. In this way the Fund maintains a strong arm over Brazil's next government. Any significant move toward fiscal expansion would trigger revocation of the promised loan, followed by capital market chaos. Or so one is led to suppose.

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