Efficiency and antitrust policy

Francesco Silva

LIUC Papers in Economics from Cattaneo University (LIUC)

Abstract: The first part of the article highlights the complex nature of antitrust deriving from its historical development, the diversity of objectives and instruments as well as its double role- the legal role which safeguards competition rights and the economic role which safeguards efficiency. Moreover, it shows how recent contributions from economic theory - theory of games, theory of differentiated oligopoly, new company theory - lead to a critical revision of the concepts which guide the actions of the antitrust. The second part of the article highlights in more detail some of the conditions between objectives and means of intervention of the antitrust and in particular between a) control of acquisitions and sanctions of collusive agreements; b) safeguard of competition in oligopoly and repression of collusion c)oligopolistic competition and abuse of the collective dominant position.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liu:liucec:48

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