The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers

Florian Herold

Munich Dissertations in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness can arise endogenously if the proposal of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.

Keywords: Evolution of Reciprocity; Trust; Incomplete Contracts; Separation of Powers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01-27
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