Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem

Fabian Herweg and Klaus M. Schmidt

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest cost under the constraint that sellers are protected by limited liability. We show that the rents obtained from reporting costs truthfully can be used to reduce the rents sellers must get for reporting the flaw. We compare the efficient Bayesian mechanism to the efficient ex post incentive compatible mechanism studied by Herweg and Schmidt (2019) that is informationally less demanding.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:84784

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