No Way Out: Dual Channels of Manipulation in Agenda Institutions

Vincent Anesi and Tianxiong Yu

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: A large body of literature in Political Science emphasizes the importance of limiting opportunities for manipulation of legislative institutions by self-interested actors. This note shows that that the very conditions that shield institutions from agenda manipulation are precisely those that expose them to capture by special interests. This result holds in a highly general dynamic framework that encompasses a broad range of empirically relevant agenda institutions and policy-making environments, including those with policy uncertainty and experimentation

Keywords: Democracy; economic influence; voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:25-14

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