Finanzhilfen bei internationalen Verschuldungskrisen?: Eine Analyse mit Hilfe globaler Spiele

Dreisbach Dina D. (), Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann
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Dreisbach Dina D.: Fachhochschule Südwestfalen, Lübecker Ring 2, D-59494 Soest

Review of Economics, 2010, vol. 61, issue 1, 1-20

Abstract: The present paper focuses on the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard in sovereign debt problems. The financial crisis is caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs of private investors and optimal policies of the national government and the official lender. Building on the global games approach of Morris and Shin (2006), we extend their analysis by calculating numerical solutions for different values of fundamental and strategic uncertainty. Our results indicate that limited financial support may even strengthen government efforts and improve welfare when fundamentals are weak but not too weak. On the other hand, we are also able to identify debtor moral hazard and welfare reducing catalytic effects with stronger fundamentals.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1515/roe-2010-0101

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