Zur juristischen Begründung des ‚Rettungsschirms‘: Eine ökonomische Plausibilitätskontrolle

Meyer Dirk ()
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Meyer Dirk: Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, 22043 Hamburg

Review of Economics, 2010, vol. 61, issue 2, 103-124

Abstract: The financial and guarantee aids within the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism suspend the Stability and Growth Pact as the basis of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The actual ‘suspension’ from the ‘no bail-out’ restriction (Art. 125 TFEU) and the prohibition of funding national debts (Art. 123 TFEU) transfers risks and financial burdens from deeply indebted states to solvent EU member states. This is the beginning of an unauthorized ‘transfer union’. This analysis does not display any evidence of market failure with respect to a potential domino effect for other EU member states. In addition, a destabilizing speculation cannot be identified. The case ‘Greece’ is rather a special case which has become a common model for other member states, caused by the Council of the European Union and the aid packages. Speculations build a part of the observable market reactions apart from pure hedging, but they simply indicate political system errors. The interventions by the European Central Bank do not lead to functioning markets. These interventions rather lead to yield structures that are inadequate in terms of risks and scarcity. Therefore they will cause a misallocation of financial resources with high economic costs.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1515/roe-2010-0201

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