EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Marktwirtschaft und Subsidiarität: Die föderative Arbeitsteilung auf dem Prüfstand

Laaser Claus-Friedrich and Jürgen Stehn
Additional contact information
Laaser Claus-Friedrich: Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel Düsternbrooker Weg 120

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 1996, vol. 45, issue 1, 58-91

Abstract: The article analyses whether the efficiency of economic policy decisions in national and supranational communities can be improved by deepening the division of labor between different levels of government. Using a model based on the theory of fiscal federalism, normative criteria for the optimal vertical distribution of authority are developed. A comparison between the derived optimality conditions and the factual distribution of authority in the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union indicates that in Germany as well as within the EU a decentralisation of economic policy authority would be welfare-improving.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-1996-0105 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:45:y:1996:i:1:p:58-91:n:5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/zfwp/html

DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-1996-0105

Access Statistics for this article

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Juergen B. Donges, Steffen J. Roth, Achim Wambach and Christian Watrin

More articles in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:45:y:1996:i:1:p:58-91:n:5