Zyklische Mehrheiten, Stimmentausch und Stabilität. Konsequenzen für die normative Konstitutionenanalyse des Deutschen Bundesrates

Jan Voßwinkel

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2010, vol. 59, issue 3, 238-265

Abstract: Bicameral parliaments are a normal feature of constitutions in federal states. They are often said to be used because of their stabilizing function for intransitive collective decisions. Intransitive decisions may occur because of logrolling. But while theory states the ubiquity of voting cycles, cycles are observed very rarely. The article argues that logrolling does not lead to cycles, but to coalitions, that are stable for a time period. The reason lies in the endogeneity of alternatives in collective decisions, as is shown by Buchanan/Congleton (1998). If logrolling does not lead to cycles, but to stable outcomes, bicameral parliaments do not stabilize collective decisions. But they alter the nature of equilibrium outcomes. The article applies these findings to the Deutscher Bundesrat.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2010-0303

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