Verlustpartizipation von Vorständen – Eine ökonomische Analyse der Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG

Duran Mihael ()
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Duran Mihael: Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Lehrstuhl für Personal und Organisation, Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Nauklerstr.47, 72074 Tübingen, Tel.: (07071) 2974145

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2013, vol. 62, issue 1, 95-112

Abstract: This paper examines the loss participation of executives following the German law of adequacy of executive directors’ compensation (VorstAG). First I provide an overview and discussion of the relevant law’ contents. To examine the potential economic impact of the loss participation, a modified tournament model is introduced. The model implies that the aspired participation succeds only partially. Hence, the law might probably fail in it’s purpose of lowering executive directors’ compensation.

Keywords: Executive Compensation; Tournaments; Executive Compensation; Tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2013-0109

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