Corona-Bonds und EU-Verschuldung: Zukunftsvision oder Europäische Naivität?

Bodo Herzog

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2020, vol. 69, issue 2, 148-165

Abstract: This article studies the current debate on Coronabonds and the idea of European public debt in the aftermath of the Corona pandemic. According to the EU-Treaty economic and fiscal policy remains in the sovereignty of Member States. Therefore, joint European debt instruments are risky and trigger moral hazard and free-riding in the Eurozone. We exhibit that a mixture of the principle of liability and control impairs the present fiscal architecture and destabilizes the Eurozone. We recommend that Member States ought to utilize either the existing fiscal architecture available or establish a political union with full sovereignty in Europe. This policy conclusion is supported by the PSPP-judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 5 May 2020. This ruling initiated a lively debate about the future of the Eurozone and Europe in general.

Keywords: Eurobonds; Corona Pandemic; European Monetary Union; EU Debt; European Central Bank; Court of Justice of European Union; Federal Constitutional Court; Eurobonds; Corona Pandemie; Europäische Währungsunion; EU Verschuldung; Europäischer Gerichtshof; Bundesverfassungsgericht; Eurobonds; Corona Pandemic; European Monetary Union; EU Debt; European Central Bank; Court of Justice of European Union; Federal Constitutional Court (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 E62 F45 N13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2020-2032

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