Selecting Equilibria using Best-Response Dynamics

Vincent Boucher

Cahiers de recherche from Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques

Abstract: I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability.

Keywords: Potential Games; Equilibrium Selection Mechanism; Basin of Attraction; Coordination Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Selecting Equilibria using Best-Response Dynamics (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1709

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