The Economics of Child Trafficking

Sylvain Dessy () and Stephane Pallage

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: In this paper, we highlight the economic effects of the existence of child trafficking. We show that the risk of child trafficking on the labor market acts as a deterrent to supply child labor, unless household survival is at stake. An imperfectly enforceable legislation aiming at fighting child trafficking, by raising the expected gains parents derive from sending their children to work, will cause a rise in the number of child laborers. We show that it can even cause the incidence of child trafficking to rise. Our findings are consistent with the view that the fight against child trafficking can only be won by effectively combining legislation with other policy measures, including better quality for education, redistribution, or appropriately targeted poverty alleviation programs.

Keywords: Child labor; Exploitation; Poverty; Law enforcement; Trafficking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J82 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0323

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