Information Revelation in an Online Auction with Common Values

Sascha Füllbrunn ()
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Sascha Füllbrunn: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sascha Christian Füllbrunn ()

No 8010, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: The Hard Close auction has become a familiar auction format in online markets and in a private value framework this dynamic second-price auction format has experimentally been tested in recent studies. Considering a common value framework, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) demonstrate that in the Hard Close auction format bidders, using a sniping strategy, do not provide information during the auction. We provide contrary results from a laboratory experiment. Bidders provide information during the bidding process, resulting in different bid functions that depend on the bidders private information rank.

Keywords: auctions; electronic markets; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C9 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:08010

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