The Truth about Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Eighteenth Annual Herbert Lourie Memorial Lecture on Health Policy

Mark V. Pauly
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Mark V. Pauly: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

No 36, Center for Policy Research Reports from Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University

Abstract: This brief is actually going to have two levels. One level will go with the advertised title, and I’ll tell you my current views on the truth about moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection will serve as somewhat of a handmaid of moral hazard, as you will see. That’s one level. The other level, though, which continues to surprise me, is that these two topics—they’re two buzzwords from insurance theory—have generated an enormous amount of policy interest and, yes, passion. Some people passionately believe some things about moral hazard that others passionately disbelieve. And so as part of this second level I will draw back a bit from the actual subject matter to ask a kind of positive public policy question: Why is it that some people can get so passionate about a subject that seems fairly esoteric?

Keywords: health insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 G18 G22 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2007-03
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