Board Compensation and Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of CEO Duality (Evidence from Banking Industry)

Abbas Ali Daryaei, Yasin Fattahi and Salar Seyfi Laleh
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Abbas Ali Daryaei: Imam Khomeini International University
Yasin Fattahi: Imam Khomeini International University
Salar Seyfi Laleh: Imam Khomeini International University

Journal of Monetary and Banking Research (فصلنامه پژوهش‌های پولی-بانکی), 2019, vol. 12, issue 39, 74-49

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore relationship between board compensation and risk taking with regard to CEO duality in the banking industry. Using a panel data regression model, with regard to optimal contracting and managerial power theory, we examined the data to determine the relationship between board compensation

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mbr:jmbres:v:12:y:2019:i:39:p:74-49

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