A Generalization of Peleg's Representation Theorem on Constant-Sum Weighted Majority Games

Takayuki Oishi ()

No 43, Discussion Papers from Meisei University, School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a variant of the nucleolus associated with distorted satisfaction of each coalition in TU games. This solution is referred to as the α-nucleolus in which α is a profile of distortion rates of satisfaction of all the coalitions. We apply the α-nucleolus to constant-sum weighted majority games. We show that under assumptions of distortions of satisfaction of winning coalitions the α-nucleolus is the unique normalized homogeneous representation of constant-sum weighted majority games which assigns a zero to each null player. As corollary of this result, we derive the well-known Peleg’s representation theorem.

Keywords: Constant-sum weighted majority games; Homogeneous representation; α-Nucleolus; Distorted satisfaction; Peleg’s representation theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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