Economics, culture, and electoral reform: The case of Japanese agricultural trade negotiations

Jarrod Hayes and Hirofumi Kawaguchi

Japanese Economy, 2015, vol. 41, issue 3-4, 80-111

Abstract: The effect of electoral structure on foreign policy is a matter of some question. The 1994 electoral reforms in Japan, which resulted in significant changes to electoral power structures, provide an opportunity to understand if and how electoral structure influences foreign policy. This article examines Japanese WTO agricultural trade negotiations in light of the 1994 reforms, looking specifically at whether or not Japan’s agricultural negotiating position as an extension of its agricultural policy changed after the 1994 electoral reforms. If democratic electoral structure has an impact on Japan’s trade negotiating position, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. The article finds that the Japanese negotiating position did not change after the 1994 reforms, raising questions regarding the impact of economic factors mediated by democratic electoral structures on economic foreign policy.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/2329194X.2016.1246333

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