Anonymity in Nonatomic Games

Lorenzo Rocco

No 53, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In nonatomic games, anonymity must be assumed in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be formalized by making payoffs dependent either on the players' distribution on the action set or on the strategy mean. An extension of Rath's (1992) proof to the case of limited anonymity is proposed: the behavior of the population as a whole, is shown sufficient to get equilibrium existence in pure strategies.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2002-08, Revised 2002-08
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http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper53.pdf First version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Anonymity in nonatomic games (2007)
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