Max-Max Group Contests with Incomplete Information à la Global Games

Davide Bosco, Mario Gilli and Andrea Sorrentino

No 548, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we introduce incomplete information `a la global games into a deterministic two-group contest with the best-shot impact function and binary actions and we characterize the set of equilibria. Depending on whether the complete information assumption is relaxed on the value of the prize or on the cost of providing effort, we obtain different results in terms of equilibrium existence: in the first case, equilibria in (monotonic) switching strategies do not exist, whereas in the second one there exists an equilibrium in (monotonic) switching-strategies for a sufficiently high level of noise. Then, we discuss the presence of the group-size paradox for the case in which incomplete information is modeled on the cost of effort. The equilibrium existence result for this setting is thus extended to the case of M groups.

Keywords: Group contests; incomplete information; global games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73
Date: 2025-03, Revised 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper548.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:548

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Pelagatti ().