Symmetry-in-Asymmetry: On the Existence and Structure of Asymmetric Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Tullock Two-Group Contests

Davide Bosco and Mario Gilli

No 579, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: When information is complete, symmetric group-contest games `a la Tullock are known to display within-group-symmetric (WGS) pure-strategy equilibria. Far less is known about the possible existence and structure of their asymmetric counterparts—pure-strategy equilibria where, symmetry notwithstanding, members of the same group exert different effort levels. This note fills the gap by proving that within-group-asymmetric (WGA) pure-strategy equilibria indeed exist, but only for a specific subset of incentivisation schemes. All such equilibria display a peculiar ‘group-splitting’ structure: a subgroup of members free-ride exerting null effort, whereas the other members provide the same positive effort level. Because of this symmetry-in-asymmetry, the game displays the same aggregative structure identified in the context of WGS equilibria. Accordingly, an explicit characterisation is feasible also for their WGA counterparts.

Keywords: (A)Symmetry; Conflict; Group contests; Sharing rules; Strategic complements and substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2026-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper579.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:579

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Pelagatti ().