Domestic Politics, Trade Policy, and Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Model with Application to United States-Chinese Relations

R. Pahre

Working Papers from Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan

Abstract: Economic sanctions are not only a foreign policy tool but a form of trade policy. Like other kinds of trade policy, sanctions attract domestic political support from both protectionists and the human rights lobby. Sometimes the human rights lobby can piggyback on protectionists to encourage policy-makers to demand sanctions, while protectionists can also hijack the human rights issue for their own ends. Two variables, WTO membership and an independent legislature, affect both the likelihood and the form of sanctions in this domestic political environment. WTO membership, like MFN treatment in general, mobilizes export interests against a trade sanctions policy. Congress's more hawkish preferences on both trade policy and human rights mean that when the United States imposes sanctions against a WTO member, it is likely to do so under congressional leadership and perhaps against the will of the president. These variables color Sino-American trade relations today.

Keywords: TRADE POLICY; INTEREST GROUPS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mie:wpaper:418

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by FSPP Webmaster ().