Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules

Ernst Maug and Kristian Rydqvist

No 07-35, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: We study shareholder voting on management proposals. We build on a simple model of strategic voting, provide structural estimates of its parameters, and derive testable implications. The evidence suggests that voting is strategic in the sense that shareholders take into account the information of other shareholders when making their voting decisions. We conclude that strategic voting prevents incorrect rejections of management proposals.

Keywords: shareholder meeting; proposal screening; strategic voting; supermajority rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2533

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