Equivalence between best responses and undominated

Alexander Zimper

No 05-08, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce's (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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