Umbrella branding and the provision of quality

Hendrik Hakenes and Martin Peitz

No 04-51, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the firm produces high quality under umbrella branding whereas it would sell low quality in the absence of umbrella branding. Hence, umbrella branding mitigates the moral hazard problem. We also find that umbrella branding survives in asymmetric markets and that even unprofitable products may be used to stabilize the umbrella brand. However, umbrella branding does not necessarily imply high quality; the firm may choose low-quality products with positive probability.

Keywords: Umbrella branding; reputation transfer; signaling; experience goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L14 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Umbrella branding and the provision of quality (2008)
Working Paper: Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2692

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