Effciency concern under asymmetric information

Evguenia Winschel and Philipp Zahn

No 13-07, Working Papers from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract: Experimental evidence from simple distribution games supports the view that some individuals have a concern for the effciency of allocations. This motive could be important for the implementation of economic policy proposals. In a typical lab experiment, however, individuals have much more information available than outside the lab. We conduct a lab experiment to test whether asymmetric information influences prosocial behavior in a simple non-strategic interaction. In our setting, a dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We find that a substantial share of subjects behaves proscially and a concern for effciency plays an important role. In our experiment the information asymmetry is actually effciency-enhancing as more subjects behave prosocially than under symmetric information.

JEL-codes: C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/33005/1/Winschel_%26_Zahn_13-07.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:wpaper:33005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Katharina Rautenberg ().