Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions

Juan Pereyra (), Li Chen and Min Zhu

No 2509, Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers from Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo.

Abstract: Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform standard mechanisms in delivering desirable results. We highlight an under-explored design dimension: the time constraints that students face under such a dynamic mechanism. First, we theoretically explore the effect of time constraints and show that the outcome can be worse than the outcome produced by the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Second, we present evidence from Inner Mongolian university admissions, which indicates that time constraints can prevent dynamic mechanisms from achieving stable outcomes, thereby creating losers and winners among students.

Keywords: Market Design; Dynamic Mechanism; Time-constrained; College Admissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnt:wpaper:2509

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