Three-types models of multidimensional screening

Luigi Brighi () and Marcello D'Amato

Department of Economics from University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi"

Abstract: This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a` la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case

Keywords: Asymmmetric information; multidimensional screening; optimal contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D58 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 24
Date: 2005-10
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