Charitable giving and intermediation: a principal agent problem with hidden prices

Nadine Chlaß, Lata Gangadharan () and Kristy Jones

No 2021-14, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time, this price is hidden from donors since they cannot verify how much intermediaries pass on. We show that while

Keywords: charitable giving; altruism; intermediation; charitable institutions; moral judgment reasoning; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papertool-v2-storage.s3.us-east-1.amazonaw ... s/moswps/2021-14.pdf Full-text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Charitable giving and intermediation: a principal agent problem with hidden prices (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-14

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://www.monash.e ... esearch/publications

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Simon Angus ().