Relational Contracts and Hierarchy

Chongwoo Choe and Shingo Ishiguro

No 2022-08, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study optimal organization design with one principal and two agents, who interact through long-term relational contracts. In centralization, the principal contracts with both agents. In hierarchy, the principal contracts with one agent, who is delegated authority to contract with the other agent.

Keywords: Relational Contracts; Centralization; Hierarchy; Supplier Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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