The design of licensing contracts: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Electrical Engineering in Imperial Germany

Carsten Burhop () and Thorsten Lübbers ()
Additional contact information
Carsten Burhop: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and University of Cologne
Thorsten Lübbers: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and University of Cologne

No 2011_18, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical results suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts.

Keywords: Economic History; Germany; pre-1913; Licensing contracts; Technology transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 N83 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2011_18online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().