The Psychological Case for Retaining Counsel: The Tipping Point Effect

John Zhuang Liu, Christoph Engel () and Yun-chien Chang
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John Zhuang Liu: University of Hongkong
Christoph Engel: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Yun-chien Chang: Cornell Law School

No 2025_01, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: A real-world puzzle has eluded the attention of scholars and policymakers. Using unique data sets covering more than 8 million civil lawsuits in mainland China, Taiwan, and Japan, we observe that parties are often pro se even when high amounts of money are at stake. One (partial) explanation could be a “tipping point effect”: parties are more inclined to be represented by an attorney if they expect the case to be a close call – and less inclined if they believe the odds of winning to be very high or very low. We support the tipping point effect in survey experiments framed as litigation. If the otherwise identical experiment is an unframed lottery, the effect disappears. Based on this evidence, we argue that the effect results from the combination of two behavioral effects: reference point dependence, and competitive spirit.

Keywords: pro se; attorney representation; reference point dependence; the near miss effect; anticipated regret; framing; competitive spirit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D86 D91 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-law and nep-mac
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