Multitasking in Corporate Tax Evasion

Philipp Meyer-Brauns

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper analyzes firms' tax evasion behavior in a principal-agent model with multitasking. A generalist firm-owner hires a specialist tax manager who chooses the quantity as well as the quality of tax evasion. Higher quality lowers the firm's expected fine for tax evasion. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that asymmetric information inside firms may enhance the efficacy of tax enforcement. This occurs because highly sophisticated tax evasion activities are often difficult to understand and assess for the generalist shareholder, who commissions fewer such activities as a result of this informational disadvantage.

Keywords: Corporate Tax Evasion; Principal-Agent Model; Tax Enforcement; Multitasking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H25 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2013-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2013-05.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2013-05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hans Mueller ().