Pension policy preferences: Beliefs about others

Carmen Sainz Villalba

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper studies the information provision and belief updating on the preference for regulation on pensions for own respondents and the preference for regulation on pensions for the population as a whole. Following the work of Sainz Villalba and Konrad (2024), we conduct a survey experiment where we provide information on own characteristics and on characteristics about individuals in other income brackets. We find that respondents who overestimate the pension coverage for low income earners are more likely to want less regulation for themselves and for the population as a whole. However, the overall effect of the information provision is very low. Like previous papers, we find that the respondents who are more knowledgeable about pensions want less regulation for themselves, but want more regulation for the population as a whole, on average, when given information about their own characteristics and others’ characteristics.

Keywords: Pensions; Knowledge; Beliefs; Government Regulation; Decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2024-13

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