Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence

Ceyhun Coban and Remzi Sanver
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Ceyhun Coban: Department of Economics,Washington University in St. Louis

No 201005, Working Papers from Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University

Abstract: We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identiÖed by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2009-08
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http://repeck.bilgi.org.tr/RePEc/msc/wpaper/mscent ... eak_Independence.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence (2014)
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