Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle: une contribution au débat

Jézabel Couppey
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Jézabel Couppey: TEAM - Université Paris 1

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The financial and banking instability of recent years gave rise to a debate concerning the appropriateness of a prudential regulation reform. This article contributes to this debate by proposing a new scheme of prudential regulation that presents three fundamental characteristics to improve the regulation efficiency. First, this scheme can be defined as a "regulatory triptych" integrating the three modes of regulation operating in the financial and banking sphere: regulation, internal control and market discipline. Second, it is "dynamic and incentive compatible" in the sense that it takes into account, period by period, of the possible reactions the agents (regulated and regulating) and implements instruments to insure the compatibility of agents incentives. Third, it is "global" (and not based on the institution) because its application concerns all regulated financial intermediaires (banks, investment entreprises and insurance companies). Indeed, the institutional nature of prudential systems seems us to be one of essential causes of their inefficiency

Keywords: financial intermediation; prudential regulation; internal control; market discipline; pre-commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 G2 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2000-01
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Published in Revue d'économie financière, Association d'Economie Financière (AEF), 2000, pp.37-56

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