Jeu de l'investissement et coordination par les intentions: des résultats expérimentaux

Claude Meidinger, Stéphane Robin and Bernard Ruffieux
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Claude Meidinger: TEAM - Université Paris 1, CNRS
Stéphane Robin: IREPD-ENSGI, Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble
Bernard Ruffieux: IREPD-ENSGI, Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper presents some experimental results that focus on players' coordination on Pareto-optimal issues of the investment game. These results show the importance of communication of intentions as a mechanism for facilitating such a coordination in different contexts (simultaneous or sequential game, with or without cheap talk, repeated game with or without a mediator)

Keywords: experimental economics; games; coordination; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2000-03
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Published in Revue d'économie politique 2001 (1), 111, pp. 67-93

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https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03718517 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.111.0067

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla00041

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