Brevet, secret et concurrence technologique: comment protéger les instruments de recherche ?

Etienne Pfister ()
Additional contact information
Etienne Pfister: CREDES et TEAM

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This article uses a two-step technological race model to evaluate the optimal protection of new research instruments, i.e., inventions that are not directly associated to commercial profits but that facilitate further technological progress. We show that paradoxically, granting the patentee an exclusive ownership right over all the research line and related applications (prospect doctrine) is optimal only when the R&D costs are relatively low and when the courts can implement mixed strategies regarding the settlement of patent trials (thus implying that identical legal cases lead to differing outcomes). In other settings, the court should rather force the infringer to pay a license fee proportionate to the R&D savings generated by the disclosure of the research instrument (enablement doctrine)

Keywords: Technological race; patent; secrecy; trial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L00 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04057.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla04057

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().