Représentation théorique des marchés de permis négociables

Nathalie Berta ()
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Nathalie Berta: MATISSE

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The question at stake is that of the theoretical representation of marketable permits. The setting up of such markets to regulate pollution problems is justified by constant reference to the efficiency of market coordination. Indeed, Montgomery established in 1972 the existence of an efficient solution - enabling the respect of environmental norms at the lowest cost. Nevertheless, the problem of the exchange process, of prices formation on these markets is generally eluded and efficiency of market coordination is implicitly assumed

Keywords: Market; perfect competition; marketable permits; pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 H23 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2004-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r04042

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