Gouvernance de la coopération horizontale entre gestionnaires européens d'infrastructures ferroviaires et interopérabilité

Julia Taddei ()
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Julia Taddei: MATISSE

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to scope the different institutional possibilities offered to the Europeans infrastructure managers into obtaining the most efficient cooperation between them and evaluate the possible effects of the European commission policy on this topic. The goal of this cooperation is to drastically improve the European railways networks interoperability that include the strategic development of European standards on infrastructure and infostructure, and the operational management of traffic needing at least some commons rules of management. We compare three modes of governance: integration, contracts driven by the European commission, and informal cooperation. We thus use neo-institutionalist approach, an historical approach and some evolutionary results into understanding the evolution of the European railways characterised by both technological and organisational lock-in, and important changing costs. We develop concept of cognitive changing costs. Our empirical work is based on interviews, empirical surveys, Eurostat data and specialised literature reading on railways technologies

Keywords: Evolutionism; transaction costs; asymmetric and private information; markets vs. hierarchies; horizontal integration; technological change; information technology; lock-in; standards; changing costs; European policy; network economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 L22 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2004-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r04043

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