Collusion in a Model of Repeated Auctions

Paul Johnson and Jacques Robert

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: A model of first price sealed bid auctions is developed where bidders meet repeatedly while independently drawing private valuations in each period.Attention is focused on symmetric collusive bidding equilibria when side-payments are not allowed.

JEL-codes: C73 D40 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9909

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