Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem

Rohan Dutta

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: The no-information case of a finite horizon joint search problem between two players with conflicting preferences is studied. It is shown that if the players have convex preferences and are patient enough, then they abandon their search by accepting the first period alternative.

Keywords: search; bargaining; committees; secretary problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2016

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