Self-Selective Social Choice Functions

Arkadii Slinko and Semih Koray

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ preferences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we introduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.

Keywords: social choice function; social choice correspondence; self-selectivity; resistance to cloning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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