On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

Rui Castro and Daniele Coen-Pirani

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper proposes an explanation of why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to plock their implementation.

Keywords: INTEREST GROUPS; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-21

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