Il canone di Telecom Italia e lo strano scontro fra Cheli e Monti: una storia, tante morali

Sandro Frova

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2001, issue 1, 111-120

Abstract: At the end of last year, the Italian incumbent on vocal (fixed) telephony raised private and business monthly connection bills. Due to a complex and controversial regulatory framework, the significant increase obtained by Telecom Italia gave to consumers and observers the impression that nobody was playing its role: why did the incumbent insist in a strategy apparently inconsistent with the unbundling of the local loop? And why did the European Commission accept this increase, despite the Italian NRA opposition? Starting from tariff rebalancing, access deficit contribution and universal service, the article draws some conclusions in terms of regulation complexity, firm strategy and relations between the NRA's and the Commission.

Date: 2001
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