Duopoly price competition on markets with agricultural products

Marie Prášilová, Lucie Severová, Lenka Kopecká and Roman Svoboda
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Marie Prášilová: Katedra statistiky, Katedra ekonomických teorií, Česká zemědělská univerzita v Praze, Kamýcká 129, 165 21 Praha 6 - Suchdol, Česká republika
Lucie Severová: Katedra statistiky, Katedra ekonomických teorií, Česká zemědělská univerzita v Praze, Kamýcká 129, 165 21 Praha 6 - Suchdol, Česká republika
Lenka Kopecká: Katedra statistiky, Katedra ekonomických teorií, Česká zemědělská univerzita v Praze, Kamýcká 129, 165 21 Praha 6 - Suchdol, Česká republika
Roman Svoboda: Katedra statistiky, Katedra ekonomických teorií, Česká zemědělská univerzita v Praze, Kamýcká 129, 165 21 Praha 6 - Suchdol, Česká republika

Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2011, vol. 59, issue 4, 241-250

Abstract: A situation, in which two firms compete, is in the economic theory described by duopoly models. Market equilibrium on the duopoly market is formed in a reciprocal adjustment process of market prices and materialized market opportunities. The goal of the analysis is to find out whether the agricultural products market is significantly influenced by appearance of duopolies, what form they have and if they can fundamentally influence the price level of food. That food chain stores endeavour to mutually adapt food product prices is generally known; it is set especially by the inelastic demand for the mentioned goods on the side of consumers, i.e., by the need to demand basic food. Duopoly reactions to price competition in food chain stores are particularly strong in the case of commodities of milk and tomatoes, where the reactions and approximation of prices can be clearly seen. Based on statistical research it is obvious that the reactions are most reflected on sales of the food chain stores Billa and Albert. To identify specific reactions of price duopoly at retail chains the ANOVA statistical method was used. The firm's duopoly behaviour as such on the food market need not be a subject for applying punishment from the antimonopoly bureau, if it does not have the cartel agreement character. An example can be the identical potato prices inquiry in the supermarkets of food chain stores.

Keywords: duopoly; price competition; chain stores; ANOVA; Bertrand model; Chamberlin model; Sweezy model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2011059040241

DOI: 10.11118/actaun201159040241

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