Mineral Resources and Conflicts in DRC: A Case of Ecological Fallacy

Giacomo De Luca, Jean-François Maystadt, Petros Sekeris and John Ulimwengu

No 1207, Working Papers from University of Namur, Department of Economics

Abstract: We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings.

Keywords: conflict; natural resources; Democratic Republic of the Congo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N57 O13 Q32 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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http://www.fundp.ac.be/eco/economie/recherche/wpseries/wp/1207.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nam:wpaper:1207

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